The problem of systematically synthesizing hybrid controllers which satisfy multiple control objectives is considered. We present a technique, based on the principles of optimal control, for determining the class of least restrictive controllers that satis es the most important objective (which we refer to as safety). The system performance with respect to the lower priority objective (which we refer to as e ciency) can then be optimized within this class. We motivate our approach by three examples, one purely discrete (the problem of reachability in nite automata), one hybrid (the steam boiler benchmark problem), and one primarily continuous (a ight vehicle management system).
Introduction
Hybrid systems, that is systems that involve the interaction of discrete and continuous dynamics, have attracted the attention of researchers from a number of traditionally distinct elds. Computer scientists have approached the problem by extending techniques that have proved fruitful for discrete systems. The main problem that has been addressed in this setting has been veri cation, that is formally proving that a given system satis es certain speci cations. One approach to this problem comes from the area of model checking 1, 2, 3, 4] , where the emphasis is on systems and properties that can be algorithmically veri ed. In problems where the model checking approach is applicable the veri cation process can be completely automated; a number of computational tools have been developed to take advantage of this property 5, 6, 7] . A di erent approach in the computer science literature has been to extend deductive techniques 8, 9, 10] . Here the emphasis has been on developing models 11, 12] that provide formal semantics for composition, abstraction, etc. and support proof techniques such as induction on the length of the system executions, invariant assertions and simulation relations. Even though automatic theorem provers can facilitate the process, most of the responsibility of the proof with this approach falls on the designer. Researchers in the areas of dynamical systems and control have approached hybrid systems from a \continuous state space and continuous/discrete time" point of view. One e ort has been in extending the standard modeling 13, 14, 15] and simulation techniques 16, 17, 18] to capture the interaction between the continuous and discrete components. Another has been in developing new analysis and controller design methodologies by extending existing methodologies such as Lyapunov's theorems 15, 19] , discrete event control 20, 21, 22] and optimal control 23, 15, 24] . Our work falls under the last category. In recent years we have developed a methodology for designing controllers for large scale systems, making use of techniques from game theory and optimal control 24, 25] . We have successfully applied these techniques to a number of problems including automated highway systems 26], air tra c management 27] and benchmark examples such as the train gate controller 25] . The focus of our work so far has been on the hybrid phenomena that arise due to the interaction between the multiple agents (e.g. vehicles, aircraft, etc.) in a large scale system. In this paper we focus on the hybrid issues that arise because of the hybrid nature of the dynamics themselves (for example a continuous system being controlled by switches). We are primarily interested in control problems where multiple requirements are imposed on the design. This is usually the case for most realistic systems. For example, when dealing with completely discrete systems the requirements usually considered are those of safety (typically encoded by requirements over the nite runs of the system) and liveness or fairness (typically encoded by requirements over the in nite runs). For conventional control problems, on the other hand, the requirements considered are usually safety (encoded by stability or constraints on the system trajectories) and e ciency (the requirement for small inputs or bounds on the speed of convergence). In such a multi-objective setting some of the requirements are usually assumed to be more important than others, either explicitly or implicitly. The ranking of the requirements can be ignored if the goal is to verify the performance of a given hybrid system, as the objective in this case is to ensure that all the requirements are met. The priority is important from the point of view of controller synthesis however, as one would like to ensure that the higher priority speci cations are not violated in favor of the low priority ones. This observation implicitly restricts the possible choices of the controllers that can be used to satisfy the lower priority speci cations. Ideally one would like to be able to classify the controllers that guarantee the high priority speci cations and attempt to optimize the system performance with respect to the lower priority ones within this class. Here we present a methodology for designing hybrid controllers for hybrid systems in such a multiobjective setting. For simplicity we restrict our attention to two performance criteria. We will use safety to refer to the high priority criterion and e ciency to refer to the low priority one. Using optimal control tools we attempt to determine the largest controlled invariant safe set, i.e. the largest set of states for which there exists a control such that the safety requirement can be satis ed. In the process we also determine the class of least restrictive safe controls, i.e. all the controls that can be used to satisfy the safety requirement for the safe states. The e ciency requirement can then be optimized within this class. The resulting controller will typically be hybrid (even if the plant dynamics are purely continuous) as it involves switching between the safe and e cient controllers. Our analysis is based on the hybrid system model introduced in 28] , which is outlined in Section 2. The design algorithm (presented in Section 3) is motivated by three examples. The rst is purely discrete and involves the control of nite automata. Here the safety requirement is assumed to be equivalent to a question of reachability of a region of the state space. E ciency on the other hand can be encoded by fairness constraints. We show how to determine the least restrictive class of safe controllers, within which one should look for the controllers that satisfy the fairness requirements.
The second example is the steam boiler benchmark problem 29] . Here the plant itself is hybrid, a continuous process (the level of water in the boiler) is to be controlled using discrete controls (pumps being switched on and o ). The safety speci cation is again a question of reachability in the (continuous) state space; we would like the water level to stay within certain bounds. The e ciency requirement on the other hand could be to minimize the number of times the pumps are switched on and o or equalize the \on" time among pumps. Here we only address the question of safety. Finally, the third example is primarily continuous and is motivated by the design of a ight vehicle management system. We consider the speed and ight path angle dynamics of a passenger aircraft. The plant is two dimensional, highly nonlinear and is in uenced by two continuous inputs, the thrust (controlled by the aircraft engine) and the pitch angle (controlled through the elevators). Switching arises from the saturation of the thrust input, which imposes three modes of operation for the aircraft: one where both its velocity and ight path angle are controlled, one where only the velocity is controlled and one where only the ight path angle is controlled. Safety is again encoded by a reachability requirement: the velocity and ight path angle should stay within speci ed limits (imposed by the engine limitations, wing stall conditions, etc.). We classify the controllers that guarantee safety and establish the mode switching required to implement them. Within this class an e ciency requirement (the magnitude of the linear and angular accelerations) is then optimized.
Hybrid System Modeling

Hybrid Dynamical Systems
The basic entity of our models will be the hybrid dynamical system or hybrid automaton (the terms will be used interchangeably). Hybrid automata are convenient abstractions of systems with phased operation and they appear extensively in the literature in various forms ( 2, 3, 12] ). The model we consider will be similar to models used primarily in model checking (in particular the ones in 30] and 31]). We will take a more input/output approach, along the lines of the reactive module paradigm 32]. For an overview of hybrid models from a dynamical systems perspective see 15] . A hybrid automaton is a dynamical system which determines the evolution and interaction of a nite collection of variables. We consider two distinct kinds of variables:
De nition 1 A variable is called discrete if it takes values in a countable set and it is called continuous if it takes values on a smooth manifold.
We will assume no special algebraic structure for the values of the discrete variables. The only operations we will allow are assigning a value to a variable and checking whether the value of a variable and a member of the value set (or the values of two variables that take values in the same set) are equal. For simplicity we will assume here that continuous variables take values in subsets of R n for some value of n. The variables in our model will be split into three classes: inputs (external), outputs (interface) and state (private) 1 . We will denote the input space (set where the input variables take values) by U = U D U C the output space by Y = Y D Y C and the state space by X = X D X C . The subscripts D and C indicate whether the variable is discrete or continuous. To avoid unnecessary subscripts we denote an element of U by u, an element of Y by y and an element 1 The terms in bold and in brackets can be used interchangeably, though we stick to the terms in bold most of the time. The former are more common in control theory while the latter are more common in computer science. of X by (q; x). To simplify the notation we will omit X D and q when there is only one discrete state and X C and x when there are no continuous states.
Our model evolves in continuous time, so we will assume that set of times of interest is of the form T = t i ; t f ] R. The variables will evolve either continuously as a function of time or in instantaneous jumps. Therefore the evolution of the system will be over sets of the form 0 0 ; 1 ] 0 1 ; 2 ] : : : 0 n?1 ; n ] with i 2 T for all i, 0 0 = t i ; n = t f and i = 0 i i+1 for all i = 1; 2; : : :; n ? 1. The implication is that i are the times where discrete jumps of the state or input occur. We will use T to denote the set of all such \super-dense" time trajectories and to denote an element of T .
De nition 2 A hybrid dynamical system, H, is a collection (X; U; Y; I; f; E; h), with Here TX C represents the tangent space of X C . We assume that f is time invariant 2 and satis es the standard assumptions for existence and uniqueness of solutions to ordinary di erential equation.
De nition 3 A run of the hybrid dynamical system H over an interval T = t i ; t f ] is a collection ( ; q; x; y; u) with x(t) = f(q(t); x(t); u(t)) (1) q(t) = q( 0 i )
(q(t); x(t); u(t); q(t); x(t)) 2 E
4. Output Evolution: for all t 2 , y(t) = h(q(t); x(t); u(t)).
It can be shown 28] that the de nitions introduced here are rich enough to allow us to model regular dynamical systems, discrete events, autonomous jumps, controlled jumps, etc.
Graphical Representation
If X D is a nite set it is very convenient to represent the hybrid automaton by a directed graph. We can associate a graph to a given hybrid automaton H using the following construction:
Nodes: the number of nodes in the graph is equal jX D j. The nodes are indexed by the corresponding discrete state value, q 2 X D . 2 With some additional notation the de nitions can be given in terms of the ow of the vector eld. The advantage of this is that they would directly extend to other cases, such as time varying vector elds and discrete time systems. Continuous Evolution: to each node, q, we associate a vector eld, f q , de ned in terms of f by: f q : X C U ?! TX C (4) (x; u) 7 ?! f(q; x; u) The implication is that while in the node q the continuous state evolves according to f q .
Node Invariants: To each node, q, we associate an invariant:
Inv q = f(x; u)jx 2 X C ; u 2 U; (q; x; u; q; x) 2 Eg X C U
The interpretation is that the system can remain in node q if and only if (x; u) 2 Inv q . Transition Guards: To the transition from node q to node q 0 we associate a guard: En0 = f(x; u)jx; x 0 2 X C ; u 2 U; (q; x; u; q 0 ; x 0 ) 2 Eg X C U (6) The interpretation is that the transition can take place if and only if (x; u) 2 En0 . Transition Reset: To the transition from node q to node q 0 we associate a set valued map: Res0 (x; u) = fx 0 jx 0 2 X C ; (q; x; u; q 0 ; x 0 ) 2 Eg X C
The interpretation is that if the transition takes place from (x; u) then after the transition the state can nd itself in any (q 0 ; x 0 ) with x 0 2 Res0 (x; u).
The above construction allows us to represent a hybrid automaton graphically as shown in Figure  1 . Note that all the information about the discrete transitions (the node invariants, the enabling conditions and the reset relations) is encoded by the set E of the hybrid automaton. Note also that there is no requirement that q 6 = q 0 , i.e. loops to the same node are allowed. 3 Multi-objective Controller Design
Operations on Hybrid Dynamical Systems
Design Framework
We assume that the plant is modeled by a hybrid automaton of the form described in Section 2. We further divide the inputs into two classes, control inputs denoted by u and disturbances, denoted by d. The input space is accordingly split into two subspaces, (u; d) 2 U D. The interpretation is that the designer can exercise control over the inputs but not over the disturbances. This implies that the controller design should be such that the desired performance is achieved despite the actions of the disturbances. Let PC denote the space of piecewise continuous and PC 1 the space of piecewise di erentiable functions of the reals and de ne the set of acceptable inputs by U = fu 2 PCju(t) 2 U 8tg and the set of acceptable disturbances by D = fd 2 PCjd(t) 2 D 8tg.
For simplicity, we restrict our attention to the case where two requirements are imposed on the system performance; we refer to them as safety and e ciency. We assume that these requirements can be encoded by a pair of cost functions, J 1 and J 2 respectively, on the runs of the hybrid automaton:
The cost functions map a run of the automaton (q( ); x( ); u( ); d( )) to a real number. To distinguish acceptable from unacceptable runs we can impose thresholds, C 1 and C 2 on the nal costs. A run is acceptable if J i (q( ); x( ); u( ); d( )) C i for i = 1; 2. We also assume that the performance criteria come with an implicit ranking, safety being more important than e ciency.
Here we restrict our attention to the case where each pair of inputs (u; d) generates a unique state trajectory for a given initial condition (q 0 ; x 0 ). We informally refer to hybrid automata that possess this property as deterministic hybrid automata 3 . In this case the cost function can be thought of as a map:
Controller Synthesis
To guarantee that the performance speci cations are met despite the action of the disturbances we cast the design problem as a zero sum dynamic game. The two players in the game are the control u and the disturbance d and they compete over the cost functions J 1 and J 2 . We seek to determine the best possible control action and the worst possible disturbance. If the performance speci cations can be met for this pair then they can also be met for any disturbance.
As higher priority is given to safety, the game for J 1 is solved rst. Assume that the game admits a saddle solution, i.e. there exist input and disturbance trajectories, u 1 and d 1 such that: J 1 (q 0 ; x 0 ) = max d2D min u2U J 1 (q 0 ; x 0 ; u; d) = min u2U max d2D J 1 (q 0 ; x 0 ; u; d) = J 1 (q 0 ; x 0 ; u 1 ; d 1 )
Then the set:
contains all states for which there exists a control such that the objective on J 1 is satis ed for the worst possible allowable disturbance (and hence for any allowable disturbance). If u 1 is used as the control it will guarantee that J 1 is minimized for the worst possible disturbance; moreover, if the initial state is in V 1 it will also guarantee that the performance requirement on J 1 is satis ed. However, u 1 does not take into account the requirements on J 2 . To introduce e ciency let: U 1 (q 0 ; x 0 ) = fu 2 Uj max d2D J 1 (q 0 ; x 0 ; u; d) C 1 g
3
Nondeterministic hybrid automata, a generalization of nondeterministic nite automata, are not covered here.
Clearly:
U 1 (q 0 ; x 0 ) ( = ; for (q 0 ; x 0 ) 6 2 V 1 6 = ; for (q 0 ; x 0 ) 2 V 1 ; as u 1 2 U 1 (q 0 ; x 0 ) U 1 can be thought of as a feedback map U 1 : X ! 2 U , that maps to each state the subset of admissible controls which guarantee that the requirement on J 1 is satis ed; in other words, the least restrictive class of safe controls. Within this class we would like to select the control that minimizes the cost function J 2 . We again pose the problem as a two person zero sum game. Assume that a saddle solution exists, i.e. there exist u 2 Then the set:
(12) contains the initial conditions for which there exists a control such that for any allowable disturbance the requirements on both J 1 and J 2 are satis ed. As the min-max problem can only be posed when U 1 (q 0 ; x 0 ) 6 = ; we have that V 2 V 1 . The control law u 2 and the set V 2 are such that for all (q 0 ; x 0 ) 2 I \ V 2 and for all d 2 D, J i (q 0 ; x 0 ; u 2 ; d) C i for i = 1; 2. As V 2 V 1 there may still be states for which the requirement for safety can be satis ed whereas that for e ciency can not. If the saddle solutions are in feedback form, the controller can be extended to these states using the simple switching scheme:
This will make the operation of the controller hybrid, even when the plant is purely continuous. Such an extension may be particularly useful when trying to design fault tolerant controllers. The occurrence of a fault signi cantly alters the system dynamics and may lead to severe shrinking of the set V 2 . One would like to be able to resort to a controller that guarantees safety, even if the requirements for e ciency have to be violated.
Technical Issues & Special Cases
The above algorithm may run into technical di culties, as there is no guarantee that the dynamic games will have a saddle solution, there is no straightforward way of computing U 1 (q 0 ; x 0 ) and there is no guarantee that the sets V 1 (and consequently U 1 (q 0 ; x 0 )) and V 2 will be non-empty. Fortunately, in the examples considered here (as well as the ones 27, 26]) a solution can be obtained analytically, or using simple numerical calculations. In general, sophisticated optimal control tools 33] can make the solution of more general problems feasible, at least numerically. Two special cases of the above algorithm deserve explicit mention. The rst is the case where there is no disturbance. The algorithm then calls for the solution to a pair of optimal control problems (rather than games). The optimal solution for J 1 will produce a set of states and classify the least restrictive set of controllers for which the safety requirement can be satis ed. The optimal control problem for J 2 will then attempt to determine the best possible control in terms of e ciency within this class. Application of this special case will be demonstrated in Section 6 on the ight vehicle management system example.
The second special case is one in which there is no control. This is for example the case in which a controller has already been designed and we are asked to verify its operation or determine the sets of initial conditions for which the speci cations are satis ed. The veri cation problem reduces to a pair of optimal control problems. For further discussion of this special case the reader is referred to 34].
4 Reachability in Finite Automata
Problem Description
Consider a standard, deterministic nite automaton G = (Q; ; ; Q 0 ) where Q is a nite set of states, a nite set of events, : Q ! Q a transition relation and Q 0 Q a set of initial states. Let L(G) denote the string of events (language) generated/accepted by G. Following 35] we assume that the set of events is partitioned into two subsets, = u c , where the events in c are controllable (in the sense that they can be disabled at will) while the events in u are uncontrollable 4 .
In this setting problems of safety are usually cast as questions of reachability: can the designer ensure that the automaton state will stay in a \good" subset Q G Q of the state space (or equivalently that it will not enter a \bad" subset Q B = Q n Q G ). E ciency typically corresponds to questions of fairness or liveness. The distinction is that safety questions can be answered by reasoning over strings of nite length in L(G) while questions of fairness require reasoning over in nite strings. Here we will show how reachability questions can be addressed using the techniques of Section 3.
System Model
We rst cast the nite automaton G into the modeling formalism of Section 2. As there are no continuous variables, X C ; U C ; Y C and f will be omitted. In the set up of 35], uncontrollable events are given \priority" over controllable ones, in the sense that they can always take place independent of the action of the controller. To capture this e ect (and motivated by a discussion in 31]) we assume that the evolution of the system takes place in rounds where a controllable event is followed by an uncontrollable one. More speci cally, we capture the evolution of G by a hybrid automaton H = fX; D U; Y; I; E; hg with X = Q,
where we assume that (q; ( ; )) = q. 4 Controllable events represent actions that the designer can choose (start processing, send message, etc.) whereas the uncontrollable events are spontaneous actions of the plant (machine breakdown, message lost, etc.).
Proof: Consider the map T GH that maps a run of G to a run of H by replacing every d 2 u by (d; ) and every u 2 c by ( ; u) and the map T HG that maps a run of H to a run of G by dropping all the . By de nition the maps are injective and surjective over the set of nonblocking traces and T GH T HG and T HG T GH are both the identity.
Fact 2 indicates that the proposed construction does not a ect the language accepted by the automaton. Therefore, controlling the automaton H, (where the system evolution is assumed to take place in rounds of uncontrollable and controllable events) is e ectively the same as controlling the original automaton G (where this restriction is not imposed). Clearly the dynamics of G can be captured by a much simpler H, one with no . We introduce the extra notation to help us preserve the \priority" of d over u. We can interpret the transition structure E as saying that u 6 = is allowed only if d = .
Reachability
Assume that a set Q B Q is given and that the controller is asked to render the states in Q B unreachable, despite the action of events in u . To ensure that the automaton H will not block for the saddle solutions (soon to be calculated) and that priority is given to d over u we add two new states, q G and q B , and rede ne X = Q fq G ; q B g, Q B = Q B fq B g and I = I fq G g. We then complete the transition relation by rede ning: Clearly, the least restrictive class of safe controls is in feedback form. The above construction can also be used for standard reachability veri cation in nite automata, by letting u = ; c = ;. If Q B is reachable,D provides an error trace starting at any state q 0 2 I \ V c 1 . In this special case the construction is not necessary. This approach can in principle also be used to address more general language inclusion problems for regular languages. However, it is likely to be prohibitively expensive computationally, as it would require construction of the automata that accept the languages and complementation of one of them. Here we will use three hybrid automata to describe the system, one for the boiler and one for each of the pumps. The speci cation of 36] also includes a valve that, together with the pumps, can be used to bring the water level to a desirable initial condition before the heating element is turned on and the boiling starts. As the valve is only used to set the initial condition, its operation will be ignored in our safety calculations. The resulting automaton will have two discrete and four continuous states. We will use x = ((q 1 ; q 2 ); w r T 1 T 2 ] T ) to denote the overall state. Without loss of generality assume that all runs of the automaton begin at t = 0. Our goal is to design a feedback controller for u 1 
System Model
For a given run the requirements are satis ed if and only if J 1 ?M 1 and J 0 1 M 2 .
Saddle Solutions and Set of Safe States
We will treat the evolution of the system as a game between the inputs u 1 ; u 2 Proof: Similar to the proof of Lemma 2, refer to Appendix A.
It should be noted that the saddle solution is not unique in the latter case, as far as the u i are concerned. In particular, any u i such that _ w(t) 0 for all t will produce the same maximum water level (equal to the initial water level). For example, any choice of u i that starts with u i (0) = 0 and does not involve switching to 1 for more than T p i at a time will lead to the same cost as the saddle solution. The saddle solutions allow us to determine the set of states for which there exists inputs for the pumps such that the water level is guaranteed to remain between the speci ed limits for any steam rate. To accomplish this we rst need to determine the costs under the saddle solutions. Let Pictorially, this boundary is shown in Figure 3 . The interpretation is that any initial condition such that either w 0 < M 2 or w 0 = M 2 and r 0 r(T 0 1 ; T 0 2 ) is safe with respect to J 0 .
The Class of Least Restrictive, Safe Controls
The calculation of the safe set also allows us to classify the controls that can keep the system safe (water level between M 1 and M 2 ) provided it starts safe (w 0 and r 0 in the ranges discussed above).
The class of safe controls is given in a state feedback form. For the \only if" part (proposed scheme is least restrictive) we only need to worry about the last three cases (the rst case is trivially least restrictive). In the last three cases at least one of the u i is restricted to be u i = 1. If u i = 0 is used instead, the conditions on the three cases and the monotonicity ofŵ with respect to T i imply that the resulting jump to T i = 0 will result in w <ŵ(r; T 1 ; T 2 ). In this situation, Lemma 2 guarantees that there exists a d (for example d = d ) and a t 0 such that w(t) < M 1 . Therefore, any control scheme violating the proposed restrictions is potentially unsafe.
Note that, asŵ is monotone in T 1 and T 2 , the condition on the last case is enabled if and only if all other conditions fail. The two middle conditions may overlap however. Therefore there is some nondeterminism in the choice of safe controls (some states may be safe with either one or the other pump on, but not neither). Note again the nondeterminism in the choice of control in the middle two cases (the system may be safe with either one or the other pump on but not both). The class of controls speci ed by the lemmas are least restrictive in the sense that any control will have to satisfy the lemma conditions to guarantee safety. If the control needs to satisfy other, secondary, objectives on top of safety, Lemmas 5 and 6 give the class of controls in which the optimum for the secondary objectives should be sought. The above calculations also lead to conditions for the existence of safe controls.
Corollary 2 Safe control laws exist if W P 1 + P 2 andŵ(W; 0; 0) M 2 . Safe control laws do not exist if W > P 1 + P 2 .
Flight Vehicle Management Systems
The ight vehicle management system (FVMS) example is based on the dynamic aircraft equations and the design speci cation of 37]. The equations model the speed and the ight path angle dynamics of a commercial aircraft in still air. The control inputs to the equations are the thrust T, accessed through the engine throttle, and the pitch angle , accessed through the elevators. The outputs we wish to control are the speed V and the ight path angle . There are three primary modes of operation:
1. Mode 1: The thrust T is between its speci ed operating limits (T min < T < T max ), the control inputs are T and , and both V and are controlled outputs.
Mode 2:
The thrust saturates (T = T min _ T = T max ) and thus it is no longer available as a control input; the only input is , and the only controlled output is V .
Mode 3:
The thrust saturates (T = T min _T = T max ); the input is again , and the controlled output is .
Within Modes 2 and 3 there are two submodes depending on whether T = T min (idle thrust) or T = T max (maximum thrust). Safety regulations for the aircraft dictate that V and must remain within speci ed limits: for ease of presentation we simplify this safety envelope, S, of 37] to
where V min ; V max ; min ; max are constant values.
We would like to design a control scheme, an FVMS, to drive the aircraft between operating points in S. The resulting trajectory (V (t); (t)) must satisfy acceleration constraints imposed for passenger comfort, and must not exit the envelope at any time. Here we describe the minimally restrictive set of controllers which guarantees safe operation of the aircraft, by classifying all of the control inputs that keep the (V (t); (t)) trajectory within the safety envelope and establishing the mode switching logic required for safety. An \e ciency" requirement for passenger comfort is then optimized within the class of safe controls.
System Model and Problem Speci cation
The ight path angle dynamics of the aircraft can be summarized using two continuous state variables, 
where a L and a D are the lift and drag coe cients, b and c are small positive constants, and is the aircraft pitch angle. We assume that the pilot has direct control over the thrust T and the pitch angle , thus u = T; ] 6 . Substituting (19) into (18) chosen to be symmetric about zero for ease of computation. In actual ight systems, the positive bound on these angles is greater than the negative bound. Also, the angles chosen for this example are much higher than what are considered acceptable for passenger ight ( 10 ).
To guarantee safety we need to ensure that the aircraft trajectory x(t) 2 S for all t. The additional constraint of passenger comfort is satis ed if the aircraft linear and angular acceleration remain bounded by 0:1g: j _ x 1 (t)j 0:1g jx 1 (t) _ x 2 (t)j 0:1g
Optimal Control Inputs and Safe Set of States
Safety is maintained by operating within the largest subset V 1 of S which can be rendered invariant by using a control input u 2 U. Let @S denote the boundary of S, @V 1 denote the boundary of V 1 .
We calculate the set V 1 by solving an optimal control problem over a time interval t; t f ]. As we are interested only in whether or not the state leaves S, we de ne t f to be the rst time at which the state leaves S:
and we let t be free. If t f exists, then for ease of notation we set t f = 0 and consider negative initial times t (without loss of generality, as the dynamics are time invariant). The cost function J 1 (x; t; u( )) depends only on the state at the terminal time: J 1 (x; t; u( )) = l(x(0)) (24) where l(x) is such that:
The optimally safe control input u ( ) 2 U is therefore the one which maximizes J 1 (x; t; u( )): u ( ) = arg max u( )2U J 1 (x; t; u( )); J 1 (x; t) = max
The Hamiltonian is given by H 1 (x; p; u) = pf(x; u) (27) where p 2 T R 2 is the costate. The optimal Hamiltonian is thus H 1 (x; p) = max u2U H 1 (x; p; u) = H 1 (x; p; u )
For a given initial time t, the safe set of states V 1 (t) is, from equations (24) and (25), V 1 (t) = fx 2 Sj9u( ) 2 U; J 1 (x; t; u( )) 0g
If we let t ! ?1, the set V 1 (t) becomes the \steady state" safe set: V 1 V 1 (?1) = fx 2 SjJ 1 (x; ?1) 0g (30) with boundary @V 1 = fx 2 SjJ 1 (x; ?1) = 0g. If J 1 (x; t) is a smooth function of x and t, meaning that there are no \shocks", or discontinuities of J 1 (x; t) as a function of x as t evolves, then J 1 (x; t) satis es the Hamilton-Jacobi equation:
with boundary condition J 1 (x; 0) = l(x). In order to compute the steady state solution J 1 (x; ?1)
of (31) 
backwards from t = 0 to t = ?T, where T is chosen to be large enough so that the solution to (34) intersects fx 2 Sjl 2 1 (x) = 0g. The optimal control u 2 is required for this calculation. At the abnormal extremal (V min ; a ), any u 2 2 min ; max ] may be used. However, as we integrate the system, we leave the abnormal extremal regardless of the choice of u 2 instantaneously, and u 2 is uniquely determined.
For all u 2 2 min ; max ], for all 2 R + , the inward pointing normal to f(x(? ); u 1 u 2 ] T ) is such that p 2 is negative, thus, u 2 = min . Denote the point of intersection of the solution of (34) In Figure 4 , the portions of @V 1 for which all control inputs are safe (U 1 (x) = U(x)) are indicated with solid lines; those for which only a subset are safe (U 1 (x) U(x)) are indicated with dashed lines. The map de nes the least restrictive safe control scheme and determines the mode switching logic. On @V a 1 and @V b SnV 1 (the upper left and lower right corners of S), no control inputs are safe.
Additional Constraints for Passenger Comfort
Cost functions involving the linear and angular accelerations can be used to encode the requirement for passenger comfort: J 2 (x; u( )) = max t 0 j_ x 1 (t)j; J 0 2 (x; u( )) = max t 0 jx 1 (t) _ x 2 (t)j
The requirement that the linear and angular acceleration remain within the limits determined for comfortable travel are encoded by thresholds: J 2 (x; u( )) 0:1g; J 0 2 (x; u( )) 0:1g
Within the class of safe controls, a control scheme which addresses the passenger comfort (e ciency) requirement can be constructed. To do this, we solve the optimal control problem: 
These constraints provide lower and upper bounds on the thrust and the pitch angle which may be applied at any point (V; ) in V 2 . Figure 6 illustrates the set V 2 , within the safe set V 1 .
Conclusions
We have presented a methodology for synthesizing controllers to satisfy multiple performance requirements for hybrid systems. In this paper we have restricted our attention to two requirements, safety and e ciency; the methodology easily extends to an arbitrary number. We have illustrated the key features of our approach using three examples, a purely discrete system, a continuous system controlled by discrete inputs, and a continuous system with discrete modes of operation induced by input saturation. The notions of \maximal safe set" and \least restrictive safe controller" are central to our formulation. They allow us to deal with the multi-objective nature of the problem by solving a sequence of nested two player, zero sum games. These notions are also important in the hierarchical control context. Assume that a number of controllers are synthesized (using the methodology introduced here for example), each designed to deal with a particular situation, and we are asked to develop a discrete supervisor to switch between them. The maximal safe sets for each controller provide necessary enabling conditions for the transitions of the supervisor; a particular controller should be invoked only if the current value of the state lies in the corresponding safe set.
In the examples considered here the maximal safe sets and least restrictive safe controllers naturally emerged from the calculations. We would like to develop a formal methodology to capture this procedure. The techniques used in the last example (FVMS) seem to be the most promising in this respect. We are currently working on formalizing these techniques in the context of semi-permeable surface calculation in pursuit evasion games. Semi-permeable surfaces form the boundary of the maximal safe set and de ne regions where there are limitations on the allowable controls. The methods presented in this paper can also have important implications for the introduction of new controllers into so-called legacy systems for real time control. Legacy systems come equipped with a controller with a guaranteed domain of validity, say V 1 7 . Assume one would like to retro-t the system with a new experimental controller with unknown domain of validity, presumably in an attempt to improve performance. This addition should be done in a way that does not compromise the safety of the system. One way of accomplishing this is to utilize the experimental controller only in the interior of the validity set V 1 and resort to the legacy controller as soon as the state approaches the boundary of V 1 . Our methods are useful for systematically computing the switching logic among the controllers and determining the switching boundaries.
A Additional Proofs T 0 i = 0 for all t As above, rst x u and allow d to vary. The resulting state trajectory will satisfy r(t) r 0 (t) and therefore w(t) w 0 (t) for all t. Hence Overall, if we restrict our attention to Case 2 (where there is some hope that the system will be safe), the above relations indicate that: J 1 (x 0 ) = minfw (D 1 ); w (D 2 )g
